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Multi-product firms, product mix changes and upgrading: 
Evidence from China’s state-owned forest areas 
 
Abstract 
Product selection matters for a firm’s productivity and long-run growth. Recent theoretical and 
empirical studies indicate that an important margin of adjustment to policy reforms is the reallocation 
of output within firms through changes in product mix decisions. This paper examines the frequency, 
pervasiveness and determinants of product switching and upgrading activities in firms located in 
China’s state-owned forest areas during a period of gradual institutional and managerial reforms 
(2004-2008). We find that changes to the product mix are pervasive and characterized by adding or 
churning products rather than only shedding products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have 
made a significant contribution to the aggregate output growth during our sample period. We also find 
that firms with different characteristics, human capital and market conditions differ in their propensity 
to diversify and upgrade product mix.   
 
Keywords: Multi-product firms, product mix changes, product upgrading, firm characteristics, 
China’s state-owned forest areas 
JEL classification: D22, E23, L11, O14  
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1. Introduction 
A rapidly growing literature indicates that what a country makes matters for its growth. In the 
endogenous growth models, such as those in Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003), long-run growth tends to depend on economic structure and the rate at which it is being 
transformed. These models suggest that specializing in the production of some products is more 
growth promoting than specializing in others. Hausmann et al. (2007) construct a quantitative index 
that ranks traded goods in terms of their implied productivity, and show that countries that latch on to 
higher productivity goods will perform better subsequently. UNIDO (2009) also finds that there is a 
strong and positive relationship between the sophistication level of a country’s industrial production 
structure (in terms of technology, organizational quality, design and logistics) and its subsequent 
growth.  
As this literature suggests, an important channel for fostering economic growth is to move up the 
product sophistication ladder by altering the production structure to products that embody high 
productivity and generate positive learning spillovers to the rest of the economy. However, product 
switching may be costly. Production of a new good requires investment, the costs of which are borne 
by the pioneer entrepreneur in full whereas the gains may not be fully appropriated. This occurs in 
both technology innovation and importation process. Hence if the inducements such as investment 
subsidies or anti-competition policy to discover costs in new activities are inadequate, product 
switching may not happen and the investment already made may well be sunk (Hausmann and Rodrik, 
2003; Acemoglu et al., 2006). Besides, unfavorable institutions and regulations on input and/or output 
markets tend to retard product switching due to the associated high sunk costs (Goldberg et al., 2010). 
Under such circumstances, economic growth is likely to be slowed down. 
The link between a country’s product sophistication and economic growth applies at the industry 
and firm level too (UNIDO, 2009). However, there are still few studies on the characteristics and 
product mix decisions of multi-product firms from developing country settings. The present paper 
examines patterns of product selection, switching and upgrading, and the determinants of the changes 
at the firm level. First, it analyzes how firms located in China’s state-owned forest areas adjust product 
lines over a period during which gradual institutional and managerial reforms occurred. Whether a 
reform can induce a reallocation of resources within industries that will render gains in aggregate 
output is a core issue for assessing the effect of the reform. Until quite recently, research into industry 
dynamics has addressed this issue by focusing exclusively on firm entry and exit where each firm is 
treated as producing a single product, and the adjustments of extensive margins undertaken by multi-
product firms through adding and dropping products are ignored (Bernard et al., 2010). Some recent 
papers empirically examine the contribution of firms’ product mix changes to the changes in firms’ 
output over time and find it significant (e. g., see Bernard et al. (2010) for the US, Goldberg et al. 
(2010) for India and Navarro (2008) for Chile).  
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The second question this paper seeks to address is how firm level characteristics drive the decision 
of a continuing firm to alter and upgrade the product mix under the institutional and managerial 
reforms. We model both the product scope growth rate and the probability of a continuing firm to 
change product mix against three sets of variables – firm characteristics (ownership, firm age, size, 
technology level measured by research and development (R&D) intensity and computerization level, 
productivity level, and product scope), human capital (age, experience, education and political 
connections of the manager, and education of workers) and market environment variables (credit 
constraints and perceived raw material supply constraints measured by perceived wood, energy, and 
other raw material supply constraints). In order to investigate the drivers of upward moves of the 
product portfolio in the productivity hierarchy, we model the likelihood that a continuing firm will 
upgrade its product structure as a function of the same variables. An increase in the firm’s detrended 
overall productivity associated with the whole product bundle computed as a firm-level analogue to 
the index in Hausmann et al. (2007) is used as the measure for product upgrading.  
The analysis is based on a unique firm level panel dataset for the years 2004 and 2008 coming 
from surveys conducted in China’s state-owned forest areas. China’s state-owned forests account for 
42% of the country’s total forest area, 68% of total timber volume, and almost all of the nation’s 
natural forest resources. They mainly locate in the upper reaches of large river basins and mountainous 
regions, and provide various forest-related products and important environmental services (Xu et al., 
2004). While historically having contributed enormously to China’s economic development, these 
areas have relapsed into the problem of “two-crises” - ecological degradation and economic loss-
making. In order to alleviate this problem, the government has implemented a series of gradual 
institutional and managerial reforms in recent years that altered the conditions in which the firms 
operated. While all firms used to be state- or collective-owned workshops of state forest bureaus 
(SFBs) which are the key economic and political actors in the state-owned forest areas, some of the 
firms have been privatized, and restructuring of the remaining ones is still ongoing. These areas hence 
provide an interesting case and an attractive setting. In addition, this dataset contains very detailed 
product information, not available in most other Chinese dataset, which allows our investigation on 
product switching and output growth. Moreover, firms in the forest areas usually engage in activities 
that do not require massive sunk cost investments in new state-of-the-art technology, which implies 
product switching is not prohibitively expensive and may happen.  
We find that there is considerable variation in the value-added associated with different products. 
Within the same industry multi-product firms in our sample are larger, more productive and more 
likely to export than single-product firms. In addition, product mix changes are frequent in our sample. 
Such changes are characterized by adding or churning products rather than only shedding products, 
and multi-product firms are more likely to change product mix than single-product firms, especially 
through product churning. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant 
contribution to the aggregate output growth during our sample periods.  
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The econometric results further indicate that some firms are more prone to diversify and upgrade 
their product mix than others. Firms that are older, have an R&D department, produce a single product, 
have a lower proportion of workers with college degree or above, have separate manager and 
Communist Party leader, and face wood supply constraint in 2004 have higher product scope growth 
rate between 2004 and 2008. Firms that are less computerized, produce multiple products, have a 
manager with college degree or above, and have less difficulty in accessing external finance are more 
likely to change their product mix. Moreover, firms that are less productive, whose manager has no 
experience of working in governmental organizations but works concurrently as the Party leader, and 
that are not confronted with constraints in either external finance or energy supply tend to have higher 
probability to upgrade product portfolio subsequently. These results hold when we control for attrition 
also.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on firm-
product level heterogeneity, and the link between productivity of a country’s industrial production 
structure and growth. Section 3 introduces the background of China’s state-owned forest areas and 
ongoing reforms, and describes the data. Section 4 documents the firm-product level patterns. Section 
5 presents the nature of product mix changes between the sample years. Section 6 discusses the 
econometric models and reports the results. Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion on policy 
implications.        
 
2. Literature review  
This paper relates primarily to two strands of a rapidly growing literature. One studies patterns of 
heterogeneity observed at firm-product level to understand how firms respond to changes in their 
economic environment. The other examines the link between the productivity of a country’s industrial 
production and export structure, and growth.     
Developments in the first literature have been stimulated by the need to ameliorate the drawbacks 
in the previous research in industry dynamics, where studies focus almost exclusively on the 
contribution of firm entry and exit to resource reallocation, treat each firm as producing a single 
product and ignore the adjustments of the extensive margins undertaken by multi-product firms 
through adding and dropping products in response to policy reforms (Bernard et al., 2010). The 
analysis on multi-product firms’ product mix decisions is intriguing since the intra-firm resource 
reallocation can potentially be a significant source of productivity increase at the firm level (Aw and 
Lee, 2009).    
Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg et al. (2010) and Navarro (2008) document patterns of firm 
characteristics and product mix changes for the US, Indian and Chilean manufacturing firms over the 
period of 1987-1997, 1989-2003 and 1996-2003 respectively.1 Though differences in their product 
                                                          
1 The unit of observation for Navarro (2008) is plant rather than firm.   
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classifications and design of firm level surveys make it difficult to compare results related to firm and 
product characteristics across countries, some similar patterns are observed. One common finding is 
that multi-product firms are stronger performers: multi-product firms are larger in terms of output2, 
more productive and more likely to export than single-product firms. In addition, they all find that 
product switching is a very common activity: 54% and 28% of surviving firms alter their product mix 
every five years in the US and Indian firms, and three quarters of Chilean firms change product 
composition in the sample period. Furthermore, changes in firms’ product mix have made a 
considerable contribution to aggregate output growth: it accounts for 25% and 55% of the net increase 
in Indian and Chilean manufacturing output during the sample period, respectively. These findings 
stress the importance of product switching activities for output growth and justify the focus on firms’ 
product margin in empirical work (Goldberg et al., 2010; Navarro, 2008).      
This firm-product level heterogeneity is usually related to international trade liberalization in this 
strand of literature. While differing in their assumptions regarding firm-product characteristics and 
dynamics, recent theoretical models of multi-product firms all predict that the range of products within 
a firm (i.e. firm scope) is an important margin of adjustment in response to trade policy changes (see 
Nocke and Yeaple, 2006; Bernard et al., 2009; Eckel and Neary, 2010). A common approach in this 
literature is to treat product switching as a selection process based on the efficiency (trade costs) of the 
products. Firms drop their least efficient products, hence reduce scope, and concentrate resources on 
their core competence. Some empirical analyses provide support for the theoretical predictions. 
Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) find that fringe products are more likely to be shed than core products in 
Mexican manufacturing firms during the period of 1994-2003 after the implementation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. Aw and Lee (2009) document trends of specialization in the 
Taiwanese electronics sector during the 1990s under the circumstances of increased foreign 
competition.  
Relocation of firms across industries or product lines is also empirically relevant in industry 
dynamics (Plehn-Dujowich, 2009). Dunne et al. (2005) study plant exit patterns in seven industries in 
the US using Census of Manufactures data for the period from 1963 to 1997. They distinguish two 
modes of exit: a plant exits the market by entirely shutting down its operation, or the plant remains 
open but shifts its production toward other products. Averaging across all industries and census 
intervals, product-line shifts in ongoing plants account for 22% of all exits, while plant closures 
account for the remaining 78%. When identifying the factors influencing the choice between the 
modes of exit, Dunne et al. (2005) find that larger and more productive firms are more likely to exit by 
changing their product lines. On the other hand, market demand has no effect on the decision of a firm 
to shift out of an industry versus shutdown.    
                                                          
2 Bernard et al. (2010) and Navarro (2008) also report that multi-product firms are larger in terms of employment. 
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The emerging literature focusing on the link between productivity of a country’s industrial 
production or export structure and growth originates from the work of Hausmann et al. (2007). The 
principal message conveyed is that what countries produce matters. While the argument that 
specializing in the production of some products is more growth promoting than specializing in others 
is not new, Hausmann et al. (2007) establish a quantitative index by which learning-by-doing effects – 
a cornerstone in endogenous growth models – can be empirically verified. They first rank traded goods 
in terms of their implied income or productivity, constructed as the weighted average of the per-capita 
GDPs of the countries exporting a particular product (which they call PRODY). They then construct 
the income or productivity level corresponding to a country’s export basket as a measure of that 
country’s specialization pattern (which they call EXPY), by calculating the export-weighted average 
of all the PRODY for that country.3 This approach attempts to classify products according to the 
outcomes of structural change they embody rather than the process technology they use (UNIDO, 
2009). They find that after controlling for standard covariates countries that specialize in producing 
and exporting more sophisticated products, those that are primarily manufactured and exported by 
countries at higher income levels, tend to grow faster subsequently. Two prominent examples are 
China and India, whose industrial productivity levels are much higher than what would be predicted 
based on their income levels. The economic mechanism behind this link is that growth is a result of 
transferring resources from lower-productivity goods to higher-productivity goods identified by the 
entrepreneurial “cost discovery” process that generates positive knowledge spillovers from the pioneer 
entrepreneur into new activities to emulators. Since the positive externalities imply that investment 
levels in “cost discovery” among private economic agents are sub-optimal, Hausmann et al. (2007) 
suggest government-led industrial policies to promote entrepreneurship and investment into new 
activities. UNIDO (2009) provides support to the aforementioned positive relationship.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Background of China’s state-owned forest areas and its reforms  
Accounting for 42% of China’s total forest area, 68% of total timber volume and almost all of the 
nation’s natural forest resources (Xu et al., 2004), China’s state-owned forest areas are an important 
part of the forest sector.4 The formation of state-owned forest areas dates back to the early 1950s, 
when the vast natural forests mainly in northeastern and southwestern China were decreed to be 
owned by the state. SFBs, which are actually state-owned enterprises, serve as the key economic and 
political actors in the state-owned forest areas, with timber logging and transportation, wood 
processing and silviculture as three primary business sections. 5 They were set up in the 1950s and 
                                                          
3 Hausmann et al. (2007) focus on exports rather than on production partly because they have more detailed data on exports.   
4 The other part of China’s forest sector is collective forest areas. 
5 In China’s state-owned forest areas, besides the administrative functions, SFBs operate as corporate enterprises. Their 
enterprise feature mainly embodies timber production and processing for revenue. This differs from the role of forest bureaus 
in collective forest areas whose sole responsibility is regional forest resource administration. 
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1960s by the government to harvest the nationalized natural forests for industrial use. There are 135 
such SFBs in China6, each of which administers hundreds of thousands of hectares of forest area, and 
employed up to a total of one million people throughout the 1980s and 1990s (State Forestry 
Administration, 1988-1999). These SFBs as part of the state-owned enterprise system, were also 
responsible for providing social services for the communities where they located, many of which came 
into existence due to the establishment of the bureaus (Bennett et al., 2008). 
To facilitate wood processing and related product manufacturing, the SFBs set up thousands of 
smaller mills, which located in geographical vicinity and were often part of the so-called integrated 
forestry system. Although a majority of them produce wood related products, there are also a host of 
mills operating in other sectors, such as food and beverage manufacturing, or providing ancillary 
services to the processing mills, such as machine manufacturing and maintenance. In the planned 
economy era, the SFBs were both owners and managers, and were the only legal agents to deal with 
the state over taxation and profit-contracting and with external economic agents (Zhang, 2000). The 
mills acted only as workshops of the bureaus with all land, capital and other material inputs supplied 
through budgetary channels, and all profits required to be remitted to the bureaus.  
Up through the late-1980s to mid-1990s, the operating expenses and social welfare responsibilities 
of the bureaus could generally be covered by the revenues generated from timber production and 
processing from natural forests, despite in many cases via unsustainable harvesting practices (Bennett 
et al., 2008). However, like other sectors in the planned economy, most SFBs suffered from low 
efficiency, overstaffing and weak competitiveness and up to the 1990s most of them run into net losses. 
The state forest sector relapsed into the problem of “two-crises” - ecological degradation and 
economic loss-making. Hence since the mid-1990s the attempts to restructuring the processing section 
have never ceased. In general, the reform has followed more or less the same course as in other state-
owned industrial sectors (Zhang, 2000), but at a lower rate. The reform has focused primarily on the 
implementation of “managerial responsibility systems” and on the transformation of organizational 
models, and then switched to privatization.   
“Managerial responsibility systems” were introduced to depoliticize the mills. Under these systems, 
managers were delegated autonomy to make many decisions, and both managers and workers were 
given financial incentives – primarily bonuses – contingent on mill performance which was measured 
by the sum of turned-in taxes and profits to the SFB. In addition, new managers were not exclusively 
appointed by the SFBs anymore, but through auctioning-off to select competent candidates. The mills 
became independent cost accounting units, which was a step toward the modern form of firm 
management. Manifold organizational reform was also widely implemented, including multi-mill 
corporation formation, joint-stock reform, contracting management, lease management, etc. (Li and 
                                                          
6 There are 20 other SFBs in China’s state-owned forest areas operating only for afforestation and reforestation.  
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Zhang, 2000). All these arrangements reflected the attempts to maximize the value of the processing 
business section and to align the interests of the managers and workers with those of the owners.  
However, the agency problem was still prevalent and the residual claim of rights was unclear in 
the state-owned mills. A gradual process of privatization was hence initiated in the late 1990s, partly 
evoked by the introduction of the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) due to the severe floods 
in 1998, which called for a logging reduction in state-owned forests and exacerbated the situation of 
mills whose raw material was mainly bought from local SFBs. Marketizing the mills and removing the 
political influence of the SFBs were the main policy changes purporting to alleviate the “two crises”. 
The privatization process is still on-going.  
 
3.2. Data collection 
This study uses combined panel data on firms and SFBs located in China’s Northeast-Inner 
Mongolia state-owned forest area, collected in face-to-face interviews with the firms’ management and 
SFBs’ officials in 2005 and 2009 by the Environmental Economics Program in China. The survey area 
covers Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and the dataset 
includes information for 2004 and 2008.   
The sampling frame for the SFBs and firms is as follows. The forests in this area are divided, 
based on geographical locations, into seven regional SFBs and managed by 84 subordinated SFBs. 
The survey covered all seven regional SFBs. At each level the samples were randomly selected to 
guarantee representativeness. In each regional SFB, the subordinated SFBs were stratified into three 
groups by the size of the forest area administered, and one was randomly selected from each group.7 
Ten firms were then randomly selected from each of the chosen SFBs. In total 206 firms were finally 
included in the survey.8 Since 32 firms did not provide detailed product information or data on other 
major variables, they are excluded from our analysis. As a follow-up survey, the 2009 survey tracked 
the same SFBs and firms that were interviewed in 2005 and no new entrants were taken into 
consideration. Systematic reasons (e.g. shutdown, merger and acquisition, temporary suspension of 
production) and random dropouts (e.g. non-reachable, decline to answer, missing values in major 
variables) rendered a reduction in the number of firms to 97 in the 2008 data.9 
While the sample size is small, the information collected is rather rich. At the SFB level, it 
contains information on SFBs’ forest resource, production and sales, financial status, employment, 
leadership and ongoing projects. At the firm10 level, the questionnaire consists of two parts. One part, 
designed to be answered by the firm manager, asks questions about the firm’s basic characteristics, 
                                                          
7 To account for the fact that the number of SFBs under the jurisdiction of Yichun regional SFB in Heilongjiang Province 
doubled that in other six regional SFBs, one more set of sample SFBs was selected. Consequently, fifteen, six and three SFBs 
were selected from Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia, respectively. 
8 According to the sampling frame, 240 firms were supposed to be interviewed. However, due to the limited number of firms 
in some SFBs, not up to ten firms could be reached in all SFBs. In such cases, all entities were interviewed.  
9 Systematic reasons account for 56% of the observation reduction and random dropouts for the remaining44%.  
10 The unit of observation in our sample is firm. It is rarely the case that a firm has more than one plant in our sample area.  
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ownership structure and privatization process, histories of manager turnover, managerial arrangements, 
contractual relations with the SFBs. The other part, directed to the accountant, covers details about the 
firm’s major financial sheets and use of inputs (capital, workers and wage bills, material and energy). 
The survey also records detailed information on each firm’s product list including names, production 
and sales prices, quantities and thereby values. In addition, general information on product market and 
raw material market environments is also collected. Hence, this dataset is well suited to study how 
firms in the state-owned forest areas adjust their product lines over time and how their choices may be 
related to the firm level characteristics.  
 
3.3. Product classification 
While our sample firms are located in forest areas, they do not exclusively produce wood related 
products. The reporting of products by our sample firms is not governed by any particular product 
classification. Since the names of products reported by the firms could differ in aggregation or the way 
firms called them, we standardize the product names and define product, industry and sector according 
to two national standards. One is China’s Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities 
(2002), henceforth ICNEA, which categorizes economic activities in China into four levels, using 
English alphabets, two-, three- and four-digit codes respectively.11 The other is China’s Product 
Classification for Statistical Use (2010), henceforth CPC, which classifies the products to a more 
disaggregated level. CPC uses a five-level coding system, with two-, four-, six-, eight- and ten-digit 
codes. ICNEA and CPC are harmonized at the two- and four-digit code levels.12 We map all reported 
product names into six-, eight- or ten-digit CPC codes and take this as the definition of a “product”.13 
We refer to the three-digit ICNEA categories as “industries” and two-digit ICNEA categories as 
“sectors”. There are a total of 90 products linked to 26 industries across 17 sectors in our data. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of industries and products by sector in the 2004 and 2008 pooled 
sample. The distribution of products by sector is highly heterogeneous. The number of products ranges 
from one in seven sectors to 47 in the Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, 
palm and straw products sector (ICNEA 20), henceforth wood processing. Similarly, the average 
number of products per industry within sectors ranges from one in ten sectors to 16 in wood 
processing. As observed in the table, 71.9% of the sample firms operate in the wood processing sector. 
Comparing the distribution of industries and products by sector between pooled all firms and pooled 
continuing firms14, the patterns are similar. However, in the latter sample the total number of products 
                                                          
11 ICNEA is comparable to the UNSD: 1989, International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, 
NEQ. 
12 At the four-digit level, ICNEA and CPC assign the same code to most, but not all economic activities. However, this does 
not matter for our analysis, since we do not use the four-digit codes as our classification for product, industry or sector.  
13 Eight-digit codes are our primary standard of classification. Two products are classified at the ten-digit level. Since for 
some products six-digit codes that are the most disaggregated level in CPC are not disaggregated enough for our analysis, we 
created the 8-digit codes by ourselves. This applies to eight products. 
14 Number of observations for the pooled all firm sample is 271, 174 for year 2004 and 97 for year 2008. Number of 
observations for the continuing firm sample is 194, 97 firms for each year. 
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reduces to 74 related to 19 industries and 14 sectors, and the share of firms operating in wood 
processing sector falls to 70.6% (results not shown). For continuing firms the number of products and 
industries increases from 62 to 66, and from 17 to 18, respectively, between 2004 and 2008. In 
addition, the share of firms operating in wood processing sector drops from 72.2% to 69.1%.  
< Table 1 to be here > 
An example of the mapping hierarchy of sectors, industries and products is given in Table A1 in 
the appendix. The table reports two industries within the wood processing sector (ICNEA 20): 
Processing of sawnwood and wood chips (ICNEA 201), which contains 17 products, and Manufacture 
of panel board (ICNEA 202), which contains 10 products. As with all classifications, the degree of 
detail varies across industries and sectors. Even so, we refer to firms producing only one product by 
our definition as single-product firms, and multi-product firms otherwise. A full list of sector, industry 
and product classification is available in an Online Appendix15.  
 
4. Firm-product level patterns  
The overall aims of this paper are to document how firms in China’s state-owned forest areas 
adjust their product lines over a period of institutional and managerial reforms and to identify firm 
level characteristics that may affect product switching and upgrading. In this section, we portray 
product level value-added, and compare single- and multi- product firms in terms of their economic 
significance and main firm characteristics. 
First of all, we investigate how products differ in terms of their value-added. This is done by 
estimating a log-form value-added Cobb-Douglas production function with product dummies as 
follows:    𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (1)     
where 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s value-added level in year 𝑡 measured as total sales revenue
16 minus 
the value of total material inputs (i.e. sum of the non-labor expenses on raw materials and energy), 𝐿𝑖𝑡 
is firm 𝑖’s labor in year 𝑡 measured by number of workers, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s capital in year 𝑡 measured by 
the net value of fixed assets, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is firm 𝑖’s product dummy for product 𝑗, and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the year dummy. 
The product dummy is equal to one over the number of product(s) for each product that firm 𝑖 
produces and zero otherwise. The time dimension of the product dummies is suppressed since we 
assume that the value-added associated with each product (𝜃𝑗) is prevailing during the whole sample 
period. Value-added and capital in 2008 are converted to 2004 constant values using different price 
                                                          
15 The web address is http://www.economics.handels.gu.se/english/staff/phd_candidates/qian_weng/. 
16 We focus on revenue-based measures of productivity rather than quantity-based measures because data on physical units of 
quantity are not available for all products and physical units of output are not comparable across firms for many products, e.g. 
wooden furniture. We are fully aware of the possible problems of revenue-based productivity measures as pointed out by 
Foster et al. (2008) and Katayama et al. (2009). It is somewhat soothing that Foster et al. (2008) find a highly positive 
correlation between revenue- and quantity-based measures of productivity for a sample of 11 homogenous products using the 
US Census of Manufactures data.    
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indices as deflators to capture the real value changes.17 The estimated coefficients 𝜃�s hence indicate 
differences in the value-added level associated with different products, conditional on the other 
explanatory variables in the model. Table 2 presents the estimation result of equation (1). The Wald 
test result of the coefficient estimates associated with the product dummies indicates that the products 
are jointly significant at less than 1% level. The standard deviation of these estimates is around 2, 
implying that there is a wide dispersion of the product-specific value-added. This result suggests that 
product selection does matter for the value-added level for a firm as a whole. 
< Table 2 to be here > 
We then explore the relative economic significance of single- and multi-product firms in China’s 
state-owned forest areas. Table 3 reports the average breakdown of single- and multi-product firms in 
terms of number and aggregate output (i.e. total sales), and also the average number of products, 
industries and sectors multi-product firms produce across 2004 and 2008. As indicated in the table, 
multi-product firms account for 47% of the firms and 50% of the aggregate output. They are relatively 
more important, but not as dominant as found in the US (Bernard et al., 2010) and Indian (Goldberg et 
al., 2010) cases.18 Multi-industry and multi-sector firms exert similar influence, responsible for 34% 
and 9% of the firms and 43% and 25% of the output, respectively. Column (3) of Table 3 reveals that 
multi-product firms on average manufacture 2.76 products, that multi-industry firms on average 
operate in 2.25 industries and that multi-sector firms on average are present in 2.08 sectors.  
< Table 3 to be here > 
Table 4 compares the characteristics of single- and multi-product firms in the 2004 and 2008 
pooled sample. Each cell reports a separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient 
(standard error in parenthesis) of the (natural logarithm of) firm characteristics (except probability of 
export which is a binary dummy) on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm produces more than 
one product (i.e. multiple products, column (1)), operates in more than one industry (column (2)), and 
operates in more than one sector (column (3)), respectively, with industry and year fixed effects 
controlled. As reported in the table, multi-product firms in our sample are significantly larger than 
single-product firms within an industry in terms of output (0.751 log points), employment (0.569 log 
points) and capital (0.753 log points).19, 20 
                                                          
17 Different variables in 2008 are adjusted by different price deflators to the 2004 price level. Sales revenue is deflated 
primarily by sectoral producer price indices for manufactured goods, together with producer price index for sector Forestry 
(ICNEA 2) and Husbandary (ICNEA 3), and country-level retail price index for sector Storage services (ICNEA 58). Capital 
is deflated by provincial price indices for investment in fixed assets. Material input is deflated by purchasing price indices for 
timber and pulp paper sector. The reason for choosing this price index is that timber and related stuff is the main material for 
our sample firms. Energy input is deflated by country-level purchasing price indices for fuel and power. All the price indices 
are obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook (2006-2009) and based upon the authors’ calculation. 
18 Though it is nice to link our results to the findings from other studies in the literature, we have to admit that comparisons 
between our study and other studies must be conducted with great caution since the sample coverage, size and economic 
environments in which the firms operate differ tremendously.  
19 The Average size of the firms, measured by output, employment and capital across the two years, is 10385 thousand CNY 
(1 USD=6.32 CNY in January 2012), 160 employees and 6001 thousand CNY, respectively. The standard deviation is 24237 
thousand CNY, 362 employees and 17790 thousand CNY, respectively, indicating that the range of firms covered by the 
survey is large. Firms range in size from 6 to 192314 thousand CNY in output, from 2 to 4992 in employees, and from 2 to 
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< Table 4 to be here > 
Multi-product firms are also more likely to export and have higher revenue-based total factor 
productivity (TFP)21 and labor productivity22 than single-product firms in the same industry, though 
the differences are statistically insignificant. This is in general consistent with the cross-section 
evidence reported by Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2010). Similar patterns are discovered 
with respect to firms producing in multiple industries and sectors, except that the differential in 
probability to export turns out to be marginally significant.  
The model presented in Bernard et al. (2009) predicts that firms possess “core competencies”, 
implying that firms should have highly skewed distribution of output towards products for which they 
have particular expertise. We find support for this prediction in our data that the distribution of output 
across products within the firms is uneven and firms possess a “core competent” product, as shown in 
Table 5. The average share of the “core competent” product ranges from 73% to 46% in total output in 
firms that produce from 2 to 6 products. These results are comparable to what Bernard et al. (2010), 
Goldberg et al. (2010) and Navarro (2008) find for the US, Indian and Chilean manufacturing firms, 
respectively.      
< Table 5 to be here > 
 
5. Product mix changes over time 
In this section, we follow the empirical product mix change literature (e.g. Bernard et al., 2010; 
Goldberg et al., 2010; Navarro, 2008) to examine the importance of changes in firms’ product margin 
over time. The average number of products across firms in our sample increased from 1.71 in 2004 to 
2.03 in 2008.    
We first illustrate the nature of product mix changes between 2004 and 2008 that resulted in the 
observed expansion of the extensive margin. We classify the continuing firms into one of four 
mutually exclusive groups based on the manner in which they alter their product mix according to the 
2004 data. The possible activities are: (1) no change – the firm does not change its product mix; (2) 
add only – the firm only adds products, i.e. some products are produced in 2008 but not in 2004; (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
176300 thousand CNY in capital.     
20 At first glance it seems to be contradictory with the finding from Table 3 that single- and multi-product firms are similar 
across size. When comparing the distribution of size (output, employment and capital) between single- and multi-product 
firms, we find that the means are very similar, whereas the median of multi-product firms is twice as large as that of single-
product firms. Therefore, the similarity across size can be explained as driven by some exceptionally large single-product 
firms. 
21 Revenue-based TFP is measured as the residual of the log-form Cobb-Douglas production function  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s output in year 𝑡 measured by total sales revenue, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s labor in year 𝑡 measured by number of 
workers, 𝐾𝑖𝑡  is firm 𝑖’s capital in year 𝑡  measured by net value of fixed assets, and 𝑀𝑖𝑡  is firm 𝑖 ’s materials in year 𝑡 
measured by the value of non-labor raw material and energy inputs. Instead of estimating the production function and obtain 
the estimates of input coefficients, we assume constant returns to scale and compute the factor cost shares. Factor share of 
labor is calculated as the share of total annual wage bill in the firm’s total sales revenue, and factor share of materials is 
calculated as the ratio of the total expenditure on material inputs to the firm’s total sales revenue. The factor share of capital 
is hence the residual share after deducting the shares of labor and materials from one. We then take the median of the factor 
shares, and they are 0.19 for labor, 0.14 for capital and 0.67 for materials.  
22 Labor productivity is measured as value-added per worker.  
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drop only – the firm only drops products, i.e. some products are produced in 2004 but not in 2008; (4) 
both add and drop – the firm both adds and drops products, i.e. “churns” products.  
Table 6 reports results based on this classification. The top panel displays average share of 
continuing firms engaging in each type of product-switching activity, and the bottom panel shows a 
similar breakdown but weighting each firm by its output. Three findings can be observed. Above all, 
product mix changes are frequent among our sample firms and adding or churning products is more 
common than only shedding products. As indicated in the first column of the top panel, over the four 
year period 61% of the surviving firms alter their product mix, 26% by adding at least one product, 8% 
by dropping at least one product, and 27% by both adding and dropping at least one product. This 
suggests that the costs are relatively low to alter product lines. Secondly, smaller firms are more likely 
to switch product lines. Column (1) in the bottom panel suggests that product-switching firms that 
account for 61% of the firms only account for 36% of the total output. Thirdly, by comparing results in 
columns (2) and (3) we find that multi-product firms are more likely to change product mix than 
single-product firms, especially through product churning. When our results are compared to the 
findings for the US, India and Chile, the third result is similar, however Indian firms experience much 
less product switching than firms in our dataset, and in the US and India larger firms are more prone to 
alter product mix in comparable time intervals.    
< Table 6 to be here > 
In order to investigate the contribution of changes in product mix to changes in output of 
continuing firms, we then decompose the aggregate changes in output into changes in output due to 
changes in product mix (i.e. the extensive margin) and changes in output due to existing products (i.e. 
the intensive margin). Let 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 be the output of product 𝑗 produced by firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝐸 be the set of 
products that a firm produces only in period 𝑡 or 𝑡 − 1 (i.e. the extensive margin), and 𝐼 be the set of 
products that a firm produces in both periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 (i.e. the intensive margin). The changes in a 
firm’s aggregate output between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 can be decomposed as ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ ∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝐸 +
∑ ∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈𝐼 . We can further decompose the (net) extensive margin and (net) intensive margin: the 
former into the margins due to product addition (A) and product dropping (D), and the latter into the 
margins due to product growing (G) and shrinking (S). Hence the change in aggregate output among 
continuing firms in our sample is   
∆𝑌𝑡 = ����∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐴
+ �∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐷
� + ��∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝐺
+ �∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗∈𝑆
��
𝑖
                                (2) 
Table 7 presents the decomposition. Column (1) reports the aggregate output growth. Columns (2)-
(4) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ extensive margin. Columns (5)-(7) report the 
contribution to growth from the firms’ intensive margin. As shown in the first column, aggregate 
output of the continuing firms increases 59% from 2004 to 2008. (Net) extensive margin and (net) 
intensive margin contribute to 86% (0.51/0.59) and 14% (0.08/0.59) of the growth, respectively. This 
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finding is at odds with those from the US and India, where firms’ intensive margin accounts for the 
majority of the output growth during their sample periods. When looking at the decomposition within 
extensive and intensive margins, we find that our data indicate a high level of “excess reallocation” (as 
coined by Bernard et al., 2010) which highlights the fact that gross changes in product output are 
substantially larger than the associated net changes. 23 As can be seen from columns (2)-(4), both 
product additions and subtractions contribute to output changes so that the gross extensive margin 
(0.72+0.21=0.93) is almost twice as large as the net extensive margin (0.72-0.21=0.51). A similar 
pattern can be found in the resource reallocation away from shrinking products to growing products 
within the intensive margin.         
< Table 7 to be here > 
 
6. Product mix changes and firm level characteristics 
6.1. Econometric models and results  
In this section, we identify the factors that may affect the decision of a continuing firm to alter and 
upgrade product mix. Before presenting the econometric model, we first discuss our measures for 
product mix changes and upgrading.  
We measure product mix changes in two ways. The first indicator is the growth rate in distinct 
products, calculated as the number of products produced by a continuing firm in 2008 divided by the 
number of products produced in 2004, minus one. The second indicator is a binary dummy which is 
equal to one if a continuing firm adds and/or drops products between 2004 and 2008, zero if not. This 
variable reveals the likelihood of a continuing firm to alter product mix, either in terms of changes in 
product number or changes in product portfolio composition with product number kept constant.  
To determine whether product mix changes amounts to upgrading, we construct an index 
analogous to EXPY in Hausmann et al. (2007) but at the firm level. The key underlying assumption 
here is that productive firms produce more sophisticated products and unproductive firms produce less 
sophisticated goods. An index 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑗, similar to PRODY in Hausmann et al. (2007),  is 
calculated as                                                            𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑗 = � 𝑠𝑗𝑖∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑖                                                             (3) 
where  𝑠𝑗𝑖 is the value share of product 𝑗 in firm 𝑖’s total sales, ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑘  is the aggregate of value shares 
across all firms producing and selling the product, and 𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 is the value-added per worker of firm 𝑖. 
This index hence represents the weighted average productivity level associated with product 𝑗 among 
its producers. As compared to the value-added associated with each product deriving from estimating 
equation (1), this product level productivity measure takes the relative importance of each product in a 
                                                          
23 Within extensive and intensive margins, gross change in output is defined as the sum of the absolute values of the 
breakdowns for output change, and net change is defined as the sum of the values of the breakdowns for output change.  
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firm into consideration. The productivity level associated with firm 𝑖’s entire product portfolio, 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖, is in turn defined by                                                            𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 = �𝑠𝑗𝑖  ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑗
𝑗
                                                        (4) 
This is the weighted average of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑗 for that firm. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷 and 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷 indices are 
calculated for 2004 and 2008 respectively.24 In order to take account of the co-variation in different 
firms’ overall productivity in a given year, we detrend this index by computing the percentage 
difference between 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 and median 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷 in respective years as                                          𝐷𝑒𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 = 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷)𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷)                                           (5) 
Product upgrading is hence defined as a positive change in a firm’s 𝐷𝑒𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 between the sample 
years, and represented by a binary dummy taking the value of one if a continuing firm experiences 
such a positive change and zero otherwise.  
Wang et al. (2010) have identified some weaknesses associated with the PRODY and EXPY 
indices proposed by Hausmann et al. (2007). In particular, Wang et al. (2010) argue that the key 
assumption underlying PRODY – the more  advanced countries produce more sophisticated products – 
may not be true. More advanced countries may often produce a larger set of products than poor 
countries. Moreover, larger countries may also often produce a larger set of goods than smaller 
countries. These features suggest that the PRODY index may overweight advanced and large countries. 
Secondly, detailed diversity in the quality and variety of goods within a product category may not be 
revealed by the indices. As analogies to the PRODY and EXPY indices, our measures 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷 and 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷 may suffer similar weaknesses. However, our product upgrading measure tries to partly 
mitigate the first pitfall mentioned above. The possible overweighting of productive and large firms in 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐷 may render an upward biased computation of both 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 and median 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷, but 
the differencing procedure in 𝐷𝑒𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐷𝑖 construction tends to offset the upward bias.     
The econometric model is specified as          𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡            (6) 
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the dependent variable of interest – product growth rate, the probability of a 
continuing firm to change product mix, and the probability of a continuing firm to upgrade product 
portfolio between the sample years. All models are estimated by OLS, and the initial year’s data are 
used for all the explanatory variables to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Firm characteristics 
include ownership (private vs non-private), firm age, firm size (measured by capital stock) and 
technology level (measured by R&D intensity and computerization level). We also control for the firm 
productivity level (measured by the natural logarithm of TFP) and the product scope (single- vs multi-
product). Human capital variables include age, experience, education and political connections of the 
                                                          
24 We suppress the time dimension of the indices to keep the expressions simple.  
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manager, and education level of workers. Market environment variables include credit constraint and 
perceived raw material supply constraints (measured by perceived wood, energy and other raw 
material supply constraints). The definitions of these variables are listed in the top panel of Table 8. 
We also control for sector dummies to account for differences in sector-specific market demand 
conditions and shocks.  
< Table 8 to be here > 
Amongst the firm characteristics variables, ownership is one important variable. Compared to non-
private firms, private firms have more discretion over product choice and less interference from the 
SFBs in their production decision-making. In all private firms the direct managerial group, consisting 
of manager, Communist Party leader, board chairman or partners, controls production decision-
making, whereas this is true for only two thirds of the non-private firms. Some studies have shown 
that restructuring of state-owned enterprises in China has had positive effects on labor productivity 
and profitability (Dong et al. 2006; Bai et al., 2009), as well as on innovative effort and returns to 
capital (Jefferson and Su, 2006). In addition, technology level captures the investment and sunk costs 
associated with innovation. Firms with an R&D department are expected to undertake more innovative 
activities and hence have a higher chance of improving future productivity. Fisher-Vanden and 
Jefferson (2008) find that in-house R&D, together with autonomous technical change and purchase of 
imported technology, are three sources driving technical change in Chinese industry. In-house R&D 
tends to be used for existing products, whereas foreign technology transfer focuses on new product 
development. However, computerization level may have two counteractive effects: on the one hand, it 
may be more costly for firms more highly computerized to switch from the production of one product 
toward alternative products; on the other hand, more highly computerized firms are more efficient in 
management of production hence are more likely to improve future productivity.  
A growing body of literature shows that political connections can help firms obtain favorable 
regulatory conditions (Faccio, 2006), overcome institutional difficulties (Li et al., 2006), and achieve 
secure access to resources such as bank loans (Bai et al., 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) and courts to 
settle business dispute (Li et al., 2008). This will eventually increase the value of firms or improve 
their performance (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). To control for political connections, we 
include in the econometric specification dummy variables indicating whether the current manager has 
ever been a government official and whether the manager also works as the leader of the Communist 
Party of China 25. 
The market environment variables measure two types of constraints on firm development – raw 
material supply constraints and credit constraint. The former capture some market and state failures 
                                                          
25 According to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Articles 29, 30 and 32), in whatever working unit where 
there are three or more Party members, a branch of primary Party organization should be established and one leader and one 
vice leader be elected by the general membership meeting. The main duty of the branch Party leader is to monitor the 
implementation of Party and State policies in firms, to participate in decision-making in key issues, and to supervise the 
manager, shareholders, or board of directors in exercising power.       
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particularly pertaining to the context of our sample area partly due to the practice of NFPP and the 
transitional nature of the economy. The latter measures a common phenomenon in the world. Many 
papers study the role of limited access to external finance and find that credit constraints hamper the 
investment in high-return activities (Banerjee and Duflo, 2004; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; De 
Mel et al., 2008; Poncet et al., 2010).       
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the continuing firms. Product scope grows 27% among 
the continuing firms from 2004 to 2008. Sixty-one percent of the continuing firms alter their product 
mix and 60% of them actually upgrade their product bundle. Forty-six percent of the firms produce 
multi-products in 2004.      
< Table 9 to be here > 
Table 10 presents the regression results of the product mix change models. We first investigate the 
determinants of the product growth rate in column (1). The first set of variables we examine is firm 
characteristics. Older firms have higher product growth rates. An increase of one standard deviation in 
the firm age will boost the product growth rate by roughly 18.8% (15.665*0.012=0.188). This may be 
because older firms have more operating experience, so they are likely more able to discern and cater 
for the market demand shift. Alternatively, it could be that the product portfolio chosen by old firms, 
perhaps a long time ago, needs to be modified in the light of new economic incentives. Firms with an 
R&D department (in 2004) also tend to experience greater product expansion rate than firms without 
one. Existence of an R&D department suggests that more stable R&D activities are undertaken, and 
the chance that new ideas are tried out for new product development may be higher. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on multi-product indicates that product growth rate is lower in firms 
that produce multiple products in the initial year than those produce single product. This result 
resembles the prediction of conditional convergence in the neoclassical growth models that a country 
will grow faster if it has lower initial per capita income. All the other firm characteristics, including 
ownership, firm size, computerization and productivity level, play no significant roles in determining 
product growth rate. The second set of variables represents controls for human capital of firms. Firms 
that have a higher proportion of workers with college degree or above, and that are managed by an 
individual who works concurrently as the Communist Party leader, experience significantly lower 
subsequent product growth rate than firms without these characteristics. Firms with a higher 
proportion of well-educated workers tend to be more highly specialized in the production of certain 
existing product(s), suggesting that it is more costly for them to develop new products. The 
combination of manager and Party leader in one person reduces the number of top decision-makers in 
a firm, possibly implying more dictatorial and stereotyped production decisions. All the other human 
capital variables, including manager age, tenure, education and experience as a governmental official, 
have no significant effects on product growth. The third set of variables measure the market 
environment in which firms operate. Only the perceived wood supply constraint is marginally 
significant and the positive coefficient indicates that firms that perceive themselves to confront with 
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wood supply difficulties in 2004 grow faster in product scope between 2004 and 2008 than firms that 
do not. This may imply that firms with such a perception shift away from producing wood related 
products to exploring new non-wood related product possibilities more rapidly in order to overcome 
this constraint.  
< Table 10 to be here > 
We then move to analyze the determinants of the probability of a continuing firm to alter product 
mix in column (2). As discussed earlier, product mix changes measure either changes in product 
number or changes in product portfolio composition with product number holding constant. Some 
different patterns emerge when this more comprehensive product switching indicator is used. 
Examining firm characteristics, the results suggest that firms equipped with a higher computerization 
level in the initial year have a significantly lower probability of changing their product mix in the 
following years. This may be because computerization is associated with high initial costs. Once these 
have been incurred, it is presumably profitable for the firm to stick to the initial product plan and not 
to change the product mix. In addition, firms that produce multiple products in the initial year are 
more likely to change product mix subsequently than single-product firms, which is consistent with 
the finding from Table 6. This may be because multi-product firms that are already selling their 
outputs in different product markets tend to have more experience in establishing distribution or sales 
networks or contacts. However, ownership type, firm age, size, having an R&D department or not, and 
productivity level of the initial year indicate no significant effects on the likelihood of following 
changes of product mix. Regarding human capital variables, only manager’s education exerts a 
marginally significant impact on the probability of a continuing firm to change product mix. Firms 
whose manager has received a college degree are 24% more likely to change product mix 
subsequently than firms managed by a less educated individual. The negative and marginally 
significant coefficient on credit constraint suggests that a higher incidence of getting rejected when 
applying for a loan in a formal financial institution leads to a lower chance of product lines switching 
afterwards. This result is consistent with the general finding in the literature that difficulty in accessing 
external finance hampers the investment in potential high-return activities.   
  We finally examine the determinants of the probability of a continuing firm to upgrade product 
mix in column (3). While not being an important determinant of product switching, initial productivity 
level plays an important role in determining subsequent product portfolio upgrading probability. Firms 
with lower initial productivity are more likely to upgrade product portfolio subsequently. An increase 
of one standard deviation in TFP will lower the probability of upgrading product mix by 9.6% 
(0.851*0.113=0.096). The key human capital variable in determining the probability of product mix 
upgrading is the political connections of the firm manager. However, the experience of working in 
government and the duality of working as both manager and Party leader have opposite impacts. One 
possible explanation could be exerted on the negative coefficient on experience of being a government 
official. Being government official and firm manager requires different sets of capabilities and skills, 
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with the former focusing on administrative and coordinative ones and the latter on profit seeking and 
managerial ones. Therefore, the human capital accumulated from working in the governmental 
organizations might not be useful for doing business, and may instead shackle the thinking and 
practice. The positive coefficient on manager and Party leader in one person, however, reflects the 
advantage of centralization of power and of political connections in resource mobilization. Concerning 
market environment, difficulty in accessing external finance and in obtaining enough energy 
significantly reduces the likelihood of upgrading the product portfolio. 
The lack of a relationship between ownership and firms’ product switching and upgrading 
activities is somewhat surprising. A potential explanation is that what is important for product 
switching and performance improvement is not the ownership per se but the intrinsic differences of 
firms and differential treatments associated with ownership, such as corporate governance, access to 
know-how, credits and markets etc., as pointed out by Estrin et al. (2009). The short panel of two 
years and small sample size restrict the analysis from addressing the effect of ownership change on 
product line changes. In the continuing firms, 32% of them were private in 2004, of which 26% were 
privatized before 2004. Twenty-eight percent were privatized between 2005 and 2008, whose impact 
cannot be taken into consideration by using our current model.      
 
6.2. Robustness analysis 
The analysis in the previous section is based on the continuing firms between 2004 and 2008. The 
OLS estimates may suffer from selection bias posed by endogenous attrition if random factors that 
affect a firm’s survival to 2008 also affect its product switching and upgrading during the time period. 
For example, some unobserved firm-specific characteristics, such as intrinsic managerial skills or a 
demand shock that maintain the firm in the market may also induce it to switch or upgrade products 
and thus introduce correlation between survival and product mix changes. To investigate whether 
endogenous attrition results in biased OLS estimates, we use Lee’s (1983) method, which is a 
generalization of the approach proposed by Heckman (1976, 1979). We begin by estimating a 
multinomial logit modeling the probabilities that a firm remains in operation, exits due to systematic 
reasons, and exits due to random dropouts in 2008. That is,          𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝐱𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝐱𝑖𝑡−1𝛾𝑗)1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝐱𝑖𝑡−1𝛾ℎ)2ℎ=1 ,           𝑗 = 1, 2                                                            𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝐱𝑖𝑡−1) = 11 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝐱𝑖𝑡−1𝛾ℎ)2ℎ=1                                                                      (7) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the survival variable: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 if a firm exits due to random dropouts, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if a firm 
exits due to systematic reasons, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 2 if a firm remains in operation in 2008; 𝐱𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 = 𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛾5𝑆𝐹𝐵 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡−1, and  𝛄 
denote the parameter vectors to be estimated. This model is estimated using all firms present in 2004 
in our sample.    
21 
 
Besides firm characteristics, human capital and market environment variables controlled for in the 
product switching equation (6), the survival model (7) includes a set of variables that determines 
selection but has no direct effect on product switching and upgrading behavior. To facilitate 
identification, instead of controlling for sector dummies, we use a binary dummy differentiating 
whether a firm operates in a sector producing wood related products or not. We also include some SFB 
characteristics, i.e. industrial gross output, private property rights development, human capital (age, 
tenure, political connections)26 of the bureau director, and change of directorship in 2004. The 
definitions of these variables are listed in the bottom panel of Table 8. Industrial gross output 
represents the economic status of a bureau. Better economic status may be positively associated with 
firm survival, for example, because economically sound bureaus are better equipped to bail out loss-
making firms. However, bureau performance and firm survival may be negatively correlated if, for 
example, strong bureaus choose not to help out struggling firms. Private property rights development 
indicates how well the idea and practice of private property rights have been developed, spread and 
recognized in a SFB. Firms administered by a SFB that has a longer history of private property rights 
development tend to be less affected by the turmoil caused by transition of ownership and be better 
prepared in terms of institutions and technologies to survive in the market without help from superior 
authorities. The human capital of the bureau director may also impact on the likelihood of a firm to 
survive. Similar as the case for firm manager but at a higher level, bureau director and Party leader in 
one person may have two counteractive effects: for one thing, this duality reduces the number of top 
decision-makers in a bureau and loses the supervision function of the Party leader, which may lower 
his or her motivation and impetus to make effort for the development of the bureau, which in turn may 
reduce the probability of survival of its administered firms; for the other, the concentration of power 
and the affiliation with the ruling Party may make it easier for the director to mobilize resources so as 
to develop the bureau, which on the other hand may raise the likelihood of survival of the firms. 
Change of directorship in 2004 measures the stability and continuity of the top administrative function. 
Such a change may disrupt the consistency of policies towards firms a bureau administers, and the 
adaptation to new managerial style or new rules may increase the probability of firm exit in 
subsequent years. The summary statistics of all firms are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
Table 11 reports the regression results of the Lee’s (1983) model. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
log-odds (i.e. logged relative probability) estimates of the survival equation for randomly dropped-out 
firms and systematically exited firms respectively, where the survival firms are used as the base 
category omitted from the estimation. When comparing the results, we can see that for randomly 
dropped-out firms only two firm level variables are statistically significant and no exclusion 
restrictions are significant at conventional levels, whereas for systematically exited firms three firm 
level variables and four SFB level variables are significant. This difference suggests that systematic 
                                                          
26 We do not control for education of bureau director defined in the same way as manager education, because all directors 
have a college education or above.  
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exit can well represent exit. Hence, in the following we focus our discussion on the systematically 
exited firms. Four significant exclusion restrictions out of six indicate that they are relevant. As 
predicted, the log-odds between exited firms and surviving ones decreases by 11% with one year 
increase in private property rights development, whereas the log-odds increases by 97% for one year 
longer tenure of bureau director and increases by 412% if the bureau under which a firm is 
administered changed directorship in 2004. Bureau director and Party leader in one person 
significantly increases the log-odds between exited and surviving firms, indicating that the 
disadvantage of power centralization dominates the advantage. Besides SFB characteristics, firm age, 
size and productivity level are also significant determinants of a firm’s relative chance of survival. The 
log-odds between exited and surviving firms is reduced by 6%, 44% and 104% with one year older in 
firm age, one log point larger capital stock and one log point higher TFP, respectively. These findings 
are consistent with those of Jovanovic (1982)’s learning model and those from many firm level 
empirical studies in both developed and developing countries. 
< Table 11 to be here > 
Columns (3)-(5) of Table 11 report the results of the product switching equation. The results are 
very similar to those from the OLS estimations presented in Table 10. The insignificant coefficients on 
the inverse Mills ratio in all three models suggest that the issue of endogenous exit of firms has little 
effect on the parameters of the product switching equation. That is, there is no strong evidence of a 
sample selection problem or that OLS estimates are biased by endogenous attrition.  
 
7. Conclusions  
We analyze how firms in China’s state-owned forest areas select, switch and upgrade their product 
mix during a period of gradual institutional and managerial reforms. We find that product-specific 
value-added has a very wide dispersion, indicating that what type of product firms produce matters for 
their overall efficiency and long-run development. Within the same industry, multi-product firms tend 
to be larger, more productive and more likely to export than single-product firms. We also find that 
changes in firm’s product mix are pervasive among our sample firms and can be mainly attributed to 
adding or churning products rather than only shedding products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product 
mix have made a significant contribution to the aggregate output growth during our sample period, 
accounting for approximately 86% of the net increase in the aggregate output (the remaining 14% is 
attributable to growth at the intensive margin).   
We estimate the effects of firm characteristics, human capital and market environment on a 
continuing firm’s decision to alter and upgrade product portfolio. The empirical results indicate that 
some firms are more prone to diversify and upgrade their product mix than others. Firms that are older, 
have an R&D department, produce single product, have a lower proportion of workers with college 
degree or above, have separate manager and Communist Party leader, and face wood supply constraint 
in 2004 have higher product growth rate between 2004 and 2008. Firms that are less computerized, 
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produce multiple products, have a manager with college degree or above, and have less difficulty in 
accessing external finance are more likely to change their product mix. Moreover, firms that are less 
productive, whose manager has no experience of working in governmental organizations but works 
concurrently as the Party leader, and that are not confronted with constraints in either external finance 
or energy supply tend to have higher probability to upgrade product portfolio subsequently. These 
results hold when we take the factors affecting firms’ survival into account.  
More generally, quantifying the impacts of firm characteristics, human capital and market 
environment is fundamental to improving our understanding of the factors underlying the observed 
patterns of product switching and upgrading within firms. Therefore, findings of this paper provide the 
basis for directions of future reforms in China’s state-owned forest areas in order to enhance efficiency 
and better handle volatilities in the markets. However, we recognize that the small sample size hinders 
us from obtaining results of more explanatory power from the econometric analysis. Moreover, the 
short longitudinal dimension of the data restricts us from addressing the effects of the dynamics of the 
institutional and managerial reforms on product portfolio adjustment. Future research could be 
directed to this field as bigger and longer panel data become available.     
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Table 1 Sectors, industries and products  
ICNEA Sector  Products Industries Products per industry Share of firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2 Forestry 2 2 1.00 0.006 
3 Husbandary 2 2 1.00 0.011 
13 Processing of food from agricultural products 3 1 3.00 0.029 
14 Manufacture of food 1 1 1.00 0.001 
15 Manufacture of beverages 7 2 3.50 0.038 
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and 
straw products 47 3 15.67 0.719 
21 Manufacture of furniture 10 2 5.00 0.082 
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 3 2 1.50 0.015 
24 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sport activities 1 1 1.00 0.010 
26 Manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical products 1 1 1.00 0.002 
27 Manufacture of medicines 4 1 4.00 0.021 
31 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 3 3 1.00 0.018 
35 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 1 1 1.00 0.007 
37 Manufacture of transport equipment 1 1 1.00 0.007 
41 Manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for cultural 
activity and office work 1 1 1.00 0.006 
42 Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 2 1 2.00 0.020 
58 Storage services 1 1 1.00 0.007 
 Total 90 26 3.46 1 
Notes: Table reports the distribution of industries and products by sector. Column (1) reports the number of products by sector. Column (2) reports the number of industries 
within each sector. Column (3) is the first column divided by the second column. Column (4) reports the share of firms producing in each sector. If a firm produces products 
in multiple sectors, the share in each sector the firm produces is calculated as the number of the product(s) in that sector to the total number of products the firm produces.  
Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample and the number of observations is 271. 
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Table 2 Product-specific value-added 
 Ln(value-added) 
Ln(employment) 0.744 (0.109)*** 
Ln(capital) 0.189 (0.063)*** 
Product dummy Yes 
Year dummy Yes 
Observations 271 
R-squared 0.71 
Wald test for joint significance of product dummies (p-value) 0.000 
Standard deviation of product-specific value-added estimates 1.994 
Notes: Table presents the regression result of equation (1). Coefficient on the constant is not reported. Data are 
for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3 Prevalence of single- and multiple- product firms  
Type of firms  Share of firms Share of output Mean products, industries or sectors per firm 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Single-product 0.53 0.50 1.00 
Multiple-product 0.47 0.50 2.76 
Multiple-industry 0.34 0.43 2.25 
Multiple-sector 0.09 0.25 2.08 
Notes: Table classifies firms according to whether they produce single product, multiple products, multiple 
industries and multiple sectors. Columns (1) and (2) summarize the distribution of firms in each category in 
terms of firm number and aggregate output, respectively. Column (3) reports the mean number of products, 
industries and sectors in each category. The unconditional mean product per firm is 1.83. Data are for the 2004 
and 2008 pooled sample and the number of observations is 271.     
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Table 4 Single- and multiple- product firm characteristics  
 Multiple product Multiple industry Multiple sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Output 0.751  (0.257)*** 0.965  (0.263)*** 1.564  (0.539)*** 
Employment 0.569  (0.173)*** 0.741  (0.184)*** 1.157  (0.325)*** 
Capital 0.753  (0.304)** 1.021  (0.328)*** 1.932  (0.519)*** 
Probability of  export 0.087  (0.058) 0.125  (0.061)** 0.207  (0.122)* 
TFP 0.107  (0.111) 0.017  (0.102) -0.070  (0.157) 
Labor productivity 0.083  (0.188) 0.197  (0.200) 0.205  (0.434) 
Notes: Table summarizes the characteristics differences between single- and multiple-product, single- and 
multiple-industry, and single- and multiple-sector firms. Each cell reports a separate OLS regression coefficient 
(standard error in parenthesis) of the (natural logarithm of) firm characteristics (except probability of export 
which is a binary dummy) on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm produces multiple product (column (1)), 
industry (column (2)) and sector (column (3)), respectively. Data for all regressions are from the 2004 and 2008 
pooled sample. Regressions also include industry and year fixed effects. Coefficients on the constant and fixed 
effects are not reported. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Number of observation for each 
regression is 271. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 Mean distribution of within-firm output shares 
    Number of products produced by the firm 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
A
ve
ra
ge
 sh
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e 
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ut
 (h
ig
h 
to
 lo
w
) 
1 1.00 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.46 0.50 
2  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.21 
3   0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14 
4    0.05 0.10 0.08 
5     0.04 0.05 
6      0.02 
Notes: Columns indicate the number of products produced by the firm. Rows indicate the share of the product in 
firm’s total output, in descending order of size. Each cell is the average across the relevant firm-products in the 
sample. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample and the number of observations is 271. Here the number 
of products is truncated at six since the survey asked product information up to six products. If a firm 
manufactured more than six products, some aggregation of the products was already taken place at the survey 
stage.  
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Table 6 Firm activity for continuing firms 
  Percent of firms 
  All firms (1) 
Single-product firms 
(2) 
Multiple-product firms 
(3) 
No change 0.39 0.54 0.22 
Add only 0.26 0.33 0.18 
Drop only 0.08 na 0.18 
Add and drop 0.27 0.13 0.42 
        
 Output-weighted percent of firms 
  All firms (1) 
Single-product firms 
(2) 
Multiple-product firms 
(3) 
No change 0.64 0.72 0.55 
Add only 0.20 0.24 0.15 
Drop only 0.03 na 0.05 
Add and drop 0.13 0.04 0.25 
Notes: The top panel displays the share of continuing firms engaging in each type of product-switching activity 
between 2004 and 2008. The bottom panel shows a similar breakdown but weighting each firm by its output. 
Continuing firms are classified into four mutually exclusive groups: no change, add a product only, drop a 
product only, and both add and drop products. This classification suggests that a single-product firm cannot drop 
a product only. 
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Table 7 Decomposition of output growth for continuing firms 
Period 
 Extensive margin Intensive margin 
Aggregate 
output growth Net 
Product 
entry 
Product 
exit Net 
Growing 
products 
Shrinking 
products 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2004-2008 0.59 0.51 0.72 -0.21 0.08 0.33 -0.25 
Notes: Table reports the decomposition of aggregate output growth of the continuing firms in our sample 
between 2004 and 2008 into the contribution of the extensive and intensive product margins. Column (1) reports 
aggregate output growth. Columns (2)-(4) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ extensive margin. 
Columns (5)-(7) report the contribution to growth from the firms’ intensive margin.      
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Table 8 Variable definitions  
Variable name Definition 
Firm Variables   
Firm characteristics   
Private 
1 if at the beginning of year 2004 the firm is private-owned, 0 otherwise. One firm 
is categorized as "private-owned" if private owner(s) hold a dominant share in the 
equity.  The original ownership type collected in our survey includes state-owned, 
collective, share-holdings, joint-venture, domestic private, and foreign private-
owned. 
Firm age Number of years between year 2004 and the year a firm was established. 
Firm size Natural logarithm of a firm's net value of fixed assets in year 2004 (CNY). 
R&D 1 if a firm has a research and development department in year 2004, 0 otherwise. 
Computerization Number of computers per worker in year 2004. 
TFP Total factor productivity measured as the residual of the log-form Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Multi-product 1 if a firm produces more than one product defined by our definition, 0 otherwise. 
Human capital  
Manager age Age of the current manager of a firm in year 2004. 
Manager tenure Number of years the current manager has been in office until the end of year 2004. 
Manager education 1 if the manager has a college education or above, 0 otherwise.  
Worker education Proportion of workers who have a college education or above in year 2004. 
Manager been government 
official before   
1 if the current manager has been a governmental official before, 0 otherwise. The 
government could be central or local government, and regional or subordinated 
SFB. 
Manager also Party leader 1 if the current manager also works as the Communist Party leader in that firm in year 2004, 0 otherwise. 
Market environment  
Credit constraint 1 if a firm has applied for a loan in any of the formal financial institutions but got rejected in 4 years until year 2004, 0 otherwise. 
Wood supply constraint 1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for wood as input cannot be met, 0 otherwise. 
Energy supply constraint 
1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for 
energy as input cannot be met, 0 otherwise. Here energy includes solid (e.g., coal 
and charcoal), liquid (e.g., heavy oil, gasoline, diesel and kerosene) and gas fuels as 
well as electricity, 0 otherwise. 
Other raw material supply 
constraint 
1 if a firm perceives that it always or sometimes happens that the demand for other 
raw materials as input cannot be met, 0 otherwise. 
Wood related product 
production 1 if a firm operates in a sector producing wood related products, 0 otherwise. 
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SFB Variables   
Industrial gross output Natural logarithm of a SFB's total industrial output value in year 2004 (CNY). 
Private property rights 
development 
Number of years a SFB has privatized part of its state-owned or collective-owned 
properties until year 2004. 
SFB director age Age of the current bureau director in year 2004. 
SFB director tenure Number of years the current bureau director has been in office until the end of year 2004. 
SFB director also Party 
leader 
1 if the current bureau director also works as the Communist Party leader in the 
bureau in year 2004, 0 otherwise. 
Change of SFB 
directorship in 2004 1 if there is a change of SFB directorship in 2004, 0 otherwise. 
Note: Table presents the definitions of the explanatory variables used in the econometric models.   
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Table 9 Summary statistics of continuing firms 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Product growth rate 2004-2008 0.274 0 0.691 -0.833 3 
Product mix changes 2004-2008 0.608 1 0.491 0 1 
Product upgrading 2004-2008 0.598 1 0.493 0 1 
Firm characteristics       
Private 0.320 0 0.469 0 1 
Firm age 14.866 9 15.665 0 58 
Firm size 14.215 14.310 2.166 7.695 18.988 
R & D 0.278 0 0.451 0 1 
Computerization 0.028 0.019 0.034 0 0.167 
TFP 2.611 2.463 0.851 0.034 7.529 
Multi-product  0.464 0 0.501 0 1 
Human capital       
Manager age 44.351 44 5.403 30 56 
Manager tenure 4.010 3 3.435 0 14 
Manager education 0.722 1 0.451 0 1 
Worker education 0.070 0.028 0.110 0 0.650 
Manager been government official before 0.773 1 0.421 0 1 
Manager also Party leader 0.237 0 0.428 0 1 
Market environment       
Credit constraint 0.113 0 0.319 0 1 
Wood supply constraint 0.423 0 0.497 0 1 
Energy supply constraint 0.103 0 0.306 0 1 
Other raw material supply constraint 0.093 0 0.292 0 1 
 
      Notes: Table presents the summary statistics of variables for continuing firms used to estimate equation (6). For 
firm characteristics, human capital and market environment variables, 2004 data are used. The number of 
observations for all variables is 97. 
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Table 10 Determinants of product switching and upgrading  
 Product growth Mix changes Upgrading 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Firm characteristics    
Private 0.042 (0.189) 0.185 (0.123) -0.132 (0.133) 
Firm age 0.012 (0.007)* 0.0004 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 
Firm size -0.054 (0.037) -0.040 (0.030) -0.024 (0.030) 
R & D 0.424 (0.219) * 0.098 (0.115) 0.207 (0.131) 
Computerization -2.385 (1.934) -3.449 (1.470)** 0.750 (1.909) 
TFP 0.031 (0.121) 0.004 (0.054) -0.113 (0.062)* 
Multi-product -0.470 (0.156)*** 0.337 (0.099)*** 0.101 (0.122) 
Human capital    
Manager age -0.005 (0.017) -0.015 (0.012) -0.014 (0.011) 
Manager tenure -0.010 (0.024) 0.002 (0.019) -0.003 (0.020) 
Manager education 0.225 (0.220) 0.244 (0.146)* 0.075 (0.157) 
Worker education -1.694 (0.868) * -0.354 (0.550) -0.443 (0.728) 
Manager been government official before -0.252 (0.289) 0.082 (0.184) -0.315 (0.145)** 
Manager also Party leader -0.413 (0.176)** -0.063 (0.122) 0.249 (0.131)* 
Market environment    
Credit constraint -0.188 (0.247) -0.359 (0.205)* -0.461 (0.245)* 
Wood supply constraint 0.317 (0.174)* 0.078 (0.119) 0.060 (0.129) 
Energy supply constraint -0.276 (0.334) -0.160 (0.190) -0.327 (0.194)* 
Other raw material supply constraint 0.324 (0.274) 0.161 (0.222) 0.199 (0.232) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 97 97 97 
R-squared 0.38 0.47 0.34 
Joint significance test: F-stat (P-value) 5.59 (0.000) 50.69 (0.000) 22284.57 (0.000) 
Notes: Table presents the regression result of equation (6). The dependent variable for each regression is 
reported in the column heading. All explanatory variables are using year 2004 data. Coefficient on the constant is 
not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11 Determinants of product switching and upgrading using Lee’s (1983) method 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Random dropout Systematic exit Product growth Mix changes Upgrading 
Firm characteristics      
Private 0.240(0.649) 0.461(0.639) 0.041(0.191) 0.182(0.125) -0.134(0.132) 
Firm age -0.007(0.022) -0.057(0.033)* 0.013(0.007)* 0.002(0.004) -0.006(0.004) 
Firm size -0.212(0.128) * -0.444(0.142) *** -0.046(0.040) -0.027(0.032) -0.014(0.040) 
R & D -0.601(0.656) -0.031(0.637) 0.432(0.217)* 0.112(0.117) 0.218(0.130)* 
Computerization -13.180(9.688) 6.393(6.050) -2.396(1.964) -3.467(1.591)** 0.736(2.047) 
TFP -0.185(0.268) -1.043(0.400)*** 0.046(0.134) 0.030(0.063) -0.092(0.064) 
Multi-product -0.008(0.529) -0.232(0.576) -0.461 (0.159)*** 0.352 (0.098)*** 0.113(0.122) 
Human capital      
Manager age -0.065(0.054) -0.055(0.052) -0.003(0.018) -0.012(0.012) -0.012(0.012) 
Manager tenure 0.034(0.077) 0.003(0.086) -0.012(0.025) -0.0002(0.018) -0.005(0.020) 
Manager education -0.327(0.579) -0.781(0.627) 0.248(0.220) 0.281(0.156)* 0.105(0.165) 
Worker education -0.999(2.943) 0.025(2.113) -1.691(0.895)* -0.348(0.582) -0.438(0.719) 
Manager been government 
official before -0.116(0.610) 0.947(0.670) -0.258(0.293) 0.073(0.191) -0.322(0.142)** 
Manager also Party leader -0.096(0.618) -0.128(0.709) -0.417(0.176)** -0.070(0.123) 0.243(0.129)* 
Market environment      
Credit constraint 0.261(0.760) 0.524(0.637) -0.199(0.245) -0.376(0.199)* -0.474(0.241)* 
Wood supply constraint 0.891(0.569) 0.372(0.578) 0.295(0.190) 0.042(0.134) 0.031(0.137) 
Energy supply constraint 0.270(0.841) 1.391(0.911) -0.282(0.334) -0.168(0.188) -0.334(0.193)* 
Other raw material supply 
constraint 0.475(0.939) -0.891(1.181) 0.336(0.274) 0.180(0.224) 0.214(0.233) 
Wood related product 
production -1.512(0.815)* -0.462(0.855)    
SFB characteristics      
Industrial gross output 0.107(0.385) 0.158(0.381)    
Private property rights 
development -0.025(0.046) -0.111(0.059)*    
SFB director age -0.011(0.060) 0.046(0.063)    
SFB director tenure -0.262(0.268) 0.970(0.315)***    
SFB director also Party 
leader 0.542(0.747) 2.011(0.795)**    
Change of SFB directorship 
in 2004 1.069(0.967) 4.115(1.430)***    
Sector dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 174 174 97 97 97 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.109(0.234) 0.180(0.196) 0.145(0.299) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.47 0.35 
Joint significance test:  
LR chi2 /F-stat (P-value) 102.66 (0.000) 5.58 (0.000) 45.69 (0.000) 116.77 (0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is reported in the column heading. Columns (1) and (2) report 
the results for the survival equation. Columns (3)-(5) report the results for the product switching equation. All 
explanatory variables are using year 2004 data. Coefficient on the constant is not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
39 
 
Appendix 
Table A1 Examples of sectors, industries and products  
ICNEA CPC Description   
20 
 
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw 
products (Sector) 
     201 
 
Processing of sawnwood and wood chips (Industry) 
 
20110101 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 
Regular size sawnwood 
 
20110204 Sawnwood for bunton 
 
20110205 Sawnwood for packing cases 
 
20110301 Not impregnated sleepers 
 
20110302 Impregnated sleepers 
 
20120101 Wood chips 
 
  
 
  202 
 
Manufacturing of panel board (Industry) 
 
20201101 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 
Plywood 
 
 
20202101 Fiberboard 
 
 
20203101 Particle board 
 
 
202041 Block board 
 
 
202099 Other panel board 
 
 
20250101 Sliced veneer 
 
 
20250102 Rotary cut veneer 
 
20250103 Micro veneer 
 
 
20250199 Other veneer 
 
 
202503 Glued laminated timber  
Notes: Table presents an example of sector, industry and product mapping hierarchy considered in this study. 
For ICNEA 201 there are a total of 17 products, but only a subset are listed in the table. For ICNEA 202, all 
products are listed in the table. CPC 20110101 is based on author created eight-digit codes that are only 
disaggregated to the six-digit level in CPC. Data are for the 2004 and 2008 pooled sample. 
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Table A2 Summary statistics of all firms 
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max 
Firm variables      
Survival 2004-2008 0.557 1 0.498 0 1 
Firm characteristics       
Private 0.379 0 0.487 0 1 
Firm age 12.563 8 13.640 0 58 
Firm size 13.630 13.816 2.169 7.313 18.988 
R & D 0.247 0 0.433 0 1 
Computerization 0.028 0.016 0.039 0 0.238 
TFP 2.465 2.400 0.947 -1.598 7.968 
Multi-product  0.408 0 0.493 0 1 
Human capital       
Manager age 43.621 43 5.584 28 57 
Manager tenure 3.966 3 3.606 0 15 
Manager education 0.621 1 0.487 0 1 
Worker education 0.070 0.025 0.122 0 1 
Manager been government official before 0.724 1 0.448 0 1 
Manager also Party leader 0.218 0 0.414 0 1 
Market environment       
Credit constraint 0.144 0 0.352 0 1 
Wood supply constraint 0.466 0 0.500 0 1 
Energy supply constraint 0.132 0 0.340 0 1 
Other raw material supply constraint 0.092 0 0.290 0 1 
Wood related product production 0.851 1 0.358 0 1 
       
SFB variables      
Industrial gross output 18.867 18.790 0.716 17.093 20.017 
Private property rights development 5.534 4 6.480 0 21 
SFB director age 46.897 48 5.539 34 54 
SFB director tenure 2.983 3 1.571 0 6 
SFB director also Party leader 0.207 0 0.406 0 1 
Change of SFB directorship in 2004 0.167 0 0.374 0 1 
Notes: Table presents the summary statistics of variables for all firms used to estimate equation (7).  For all 
variables except survival 2004-2008, 2004 data are used. The number of observations for all variables is 174. 
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Online Appendix for 
 
Multi-product firms, product mix changes and upgrading:  
Evidence from China’s state-owned forest areas 
 
Måns Söderbom and Qian Weng 
 
 
This appendix presents the full list of sector, industry and product classification considered in this 
study. The classification procedure is as follows. Since the reporting of products by our sample firms 
is not governed by any particular product classification, and the names of products reported could 
differ in aggregation or the way firms called them, we standardize the product names and define 
product, industry and sector according to two national standards. One is China’s Industrial 
Classification for National Economic Activities (2002), henceforth ICNEA, which categorizes 
economic activities in China into four levels, using English alphabets, two-, three- and four-digit codes 
respectively. ICNEA is comparable to the UNSD: 1989, International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities, NEQ. The other is China’s Product Classification for 
Statistical Use (2010), henceforth CPC, which classifies the products to a more disaggregated level. 
CPC uses a five-level coding system, with two-, four-, six-, eight- and ten-digit codes. ICNEA and 
CPC are harmonized at the two- and four-digit code levels. At the four-digit level, ICNEA and CPC 
assign the same code to most, but not all economic activities. We map all reported product names into 
six-, eight- or ten-digit CPC codes and take this as the definition of a “product”.  Eight-digit codes are 
our primary standard of classification. Two products are classified at the ten-digit level. Since for 
some products six-digit codes that are the most disaggregated level in CPC are not disaggregated 
enough for our analysis, we created the 8-digit codes by ourselves. This applies to eight products and 
they are marked with * in the list. We refer to the three-digit ICNEA categories as “industries” and 
two-digit ICNEA categories as “sectors”. There are a total of 90 products linked to 26 industries 
across 17 sectors in our data. In our sample there are four products that ICNEA and CPC assign 
different codes at the four-digit level. We take the CPC codes as our standard and use the 
corresponding 3-digit codes in ICNEA as our classification for industries. 
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Sector Industry Product 
02 Forestry 021 Nurture and planting of trees 02110101 Coniferous tree seeds 
  022 Harvesting and transport of timber and 
bamboo 
02214001 Softwood small size lumber  
03 Husbandary 033 Poultry feeding 03301041 Chicken 
  039 Other husbandary 03387503 Pilos antler  
13 Processing of food from agricultural 
products 
137 Processing of vegetables, fruits and nuts 13714011 Dried mushrooms and truffles 
   13716011 Sweet and sour pickles 
    13716021 Pickles 
14 Manufacture of food 145 Manufacture of canned food 14504199 Other canned fruit 
15 Manufacture of beverages 152 Manufacture of alcoholic beverages 152151 Liquid distillate spirits 
    152910 Fruit wine 
    152970 Compound liquor 
  153 Manufacture of soft drinks 15302101 Bottled drinking mineral water 
    15303111 Fruit juice 
    15303170 Concentrated fruit juice 
    15303511 Fruit juice beverage 
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of  
wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw  
products 
201 Processing of sawnwood and wood chips  20110101* Regular size sawnwood 
   20110102* Small size sawnwood 
   20110103* Wood in the rough 
    20110104* Wood strips 
    20110105* Dressed timber 
    20110106* Sawnwood for wall plank  
    20110107* Sawnwood for furniture 
    20110108* Sawnwood for wood flooring 
    20110202 Sawnwood for motorlorry 
    20110204 Sawnwood for bunton  
    20110205 Sawnwood for packing cases 
    20110206 Sawnwood for drill frame  
    20110299 Sawnwood of other special types 
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    20110301 Not impregnated sleepers 
    20110302 Impregnated sleepers 
    201199 Other sawnwood 
    20120101 Wood chips 
  202 Manufacture of Panel Board 20201101 Plywood 
    20202101 Fiberboard 
    20203101 Particle board 
    202041 Block board 
    202099 Other panel board 
    20250101 Sliced veneer 
    20250102 Rotary cut veneer 
    20250103 Micro veneer 
    20250199 Other veneer 
    202503 Glued laminated timber  
  203 Manufacture of wood products 20310101 Solid wood doors 
    20310103 Wooden door frames and sills 
    20310201 Wooden windows 
    203103 Mouldings 
    20310401 Solid wood flooring 
    20310402 Composite wood flooring 
    203199 Other wood products used in construction 
    20320102 Wooden trough 
    20320202 Packing boxes 
    20320203 Crates 
    20320302 Box pallets 
    20320304 Pallets and protection frames 
    20350301 Agglomerated cork articles in brick, block, 
or strip   
    20390401 Wooden chopsticks 
    20390404 Wooden chopping board 
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    20390499 Other kitchenware of wood 
    20390501 Wooden frames for paintings, photographs, 
mirrors or similar objects 
or similar objects 
    20390502 Wooden hangers  
    20390503 Wooden tools and tool handles  
    20390599 Other articles of wood 
21 Manufacture of furniture 211 Manufacture of wooden furniture 21100101 Wooden beds 
    2110010202 Wooden wardrobe used in the bedroom 
    2110010299 Other wooden furniture used in the 
bedroom  
    21100203 Seats with wooden frames 
    21100301 Wooden desks 
    21100401 Redwood furniture used in the dining room 
and kitchen  
    21100403 Panel board furniture used in the dining 
room and kitchen 
    21100501 Wood kitchen cabinets 
    211099 Other wooden furniture 
  219 Manufacture of furniture with other materials 215102 Mattresses 
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 222 Manufacture of paper 22210202 Liner board 
    22230601 Corrugated paper 
  223  223001 Packing containers of paper and 
paperboard 
24 Manufacture of articles for culture, 
education and sport activities 
241 Manufacture of articles for education 
activities 
24121140 Pencils 
26 Manufacture of raw chemical materials 
and chemical products 
266 Manufacture of specialty chemical products 26634101 Pyrolysis wood products 
27 Manufacture of medicines 274 Manufacture of Chinese medicine 27403107 Oral tonifying medication 
    27403108 Tonifying capsules 
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    27404308 Qi-regulating capsules 
    27407308 Menstruation-regulating capsules 
31 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products 
311 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 31112010 Cement of general purpose 
 312 Manufacture of articles of plaster and lime 31216010 Bricks of cement and concrete 
  319 Manufacture of graphite and other non-
metallic mineral products 
317610 Natural abrasive 
35 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 355 Manufacture of shaft bearings, gears, gearing 
and transmission parts 
34941011 Articulated link chain 
37 Manufacture of transport equipment 372 Manufacture of motor vehicles 372610 Maintenance and repair services of motor 
vehicles 
41 Manufacture of measuring instruments and 
machinery for cultural activity and office 
work 
413 Manufacture of clocks, watches and 
chronometric instruments  
413010 Clocks 
42 Manufacture of artwork and other 
manufacturing 
421 Manufacture of artwork 42113001 Wood carvings 
   42113099 Other natural plant carving artwork 
58 Storage services 589 Other storage services 58020101 Storage services of cruid oil and refined oil  
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